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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTIIORITY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

10395

ISLAND RANCHING COMP ANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is brought before the Court on Interlocutory Appeal under the provisions of Rule 72 ( b) ,
Utah Hules of Civil Procedure. The action is one in
eminent domain, initiated by the Respondent to acquire
properties of the Appellant. The Appeal raises issues
of law questioning the constitutional validity of Title
fl.5, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
establishing the Great Salt Lake Authority as well as
the Authority's power to condemn the lands of Appellant.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The trial Court entered an Order denying Island
Ranching Company's lVIotion to dismiss the Complaint
in condemnation of GSLA for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted on May 26, 1965.
The Complaint was dismissed on all counts. On the
same date, the lower Court also granted Appellant an
extension of time in which to respond to the Complaint
so as to permit Appellant to file a petition for interlocutory appeal with this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Order of the trial Court denying Appellant's
~lotion to dismiss the Complaint of the Great Salt Lake
Authority should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts as accurate and correct the
Statement of Facts contained in Appellant's Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
GSLA'S COMPLAINT WAS A PROPER TEST
OF THE COMPLAINT'S LEGAL SUFFICl
ENCY.
2

The above point is accepted as correct by Respondent and is not contested in this brief.

POINT II
THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF
GSLA'S PO-\VER AS STATED IN THE ACT
IS CAP ABLE OF DEFINITION AND THE
ACT CANNOT BE DECLARED UNCONSTITGTION ALLY INVALID ON THAT BASIS.
The appellant states that Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, is invalid and unenforceable for
failure to adequately define the territorial jurisdiction
of the power of the Great Salt Lake Authority.
( 1) The title to the Act establishing the Great
Salt Lake Authority is a valid source of legislative intent for the purpose of resolving
ambiguities within the body of the Act.
Section 65-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, defines the purpose of the Act as the developrnent of the "Great Salt Lake and its environs," which
appellant asserts is an inadequate delineation of territorial jurisdiction.
If the phrase can be said to be ambiguous, it is a
\\'ell recognized principle of statutory construction that
courts can seek interpretive guidance from sources
n:trinsic to the actual body of the statute. Sutherland,
St11t utor.lJ Construction, Section 4506, 3rd ed.
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A primary aid, extrinsic to the statutory provisions,
in determining the legislative intent is the title of th:
statute.
"In short, in ascertaining the intention of the
legislature nothing is to be rejected whid1 will
assist in the clarification of ambiguous phrases
and where the title throws light on the meanin()'
of the statute itself, it is an available tool for th~
resolution of the doubt." Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Section 4802, 3rd ed.
In Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2. U. 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954), this
Court stated its view of the statute's title as an aid to
construction: where a statute is ambiguous, it is " ...
permissible to consider the title of the statute, which
admittedly is no part of its actual context, to shed light
on its meaning." (P. 183, 272 P.2d). The Court cited
the above quoted portion of Sutherland, Statutory Construction, in support of its opinion.
The principle quoted above from the Utah decision
and Sutherland, supra, is widely accepted in other jurisdictions including the Supreme Court of the United
States. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Co., 331 U.S. 519, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91
L.Ed. 1646 (1946).
State courts have generally adopted the same view.
The Montana Court has held that the title may be lookc~
to in determining legislative intent. In Re Coleman.i·
Estate, Mont., 132 J\ilont. 339, 317 P.2d 880 (195 7).
The California Court has on several occasions heltl
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that the title of an act may be relied upon when attempting to ascertain legislative intent: that the title may
guide the Court in determining the " ... intended scope
of legislation", People v. Tawney , 168 C.A.2d 599,
366 P.2d 659, 668 (1959); Lawton v. Board of Medical Examiners ,147 C.A.2d 256, 299 P.2d 362 (1956),
in support of the general proposition stated.
Appellant's statement that the jurisdictional and
constitutional requirements of a statute cannot be supplied by the title is irrelevant, misleading, and unsupported by the authorities he cites. (P. 13, Appellant's
Brief). The respondent is not arguing that the title
of an act is part of the "law", nor that the title should
supply necessary elements that are totally lacking in
the statute. The argument is only that the title of a
statute can properly be looked to in determining legislative intent as to those existing elements which are
indefiinite, uncertain or ambiguous.
The decisions do not distinguish the types of ambiguities which can be resolved by looking to the title
of the statute. The Utah Court in Donahue, supra,
utilized the title to a statute in question to resolve
an ambiguity in favor of a result which avoided invalidating the statute as unconstitutional. Several decisions
l1ave utilized the statutory title to determine the intended
Sl'ripe of the statute as to persons affected and territory
involved. Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35,
108 P.2d 646 (1949); Police Pension Board of City
:i( Phoenix v. Warren, 97 Ariz. 180, 398 P.2d 892
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(1965); l(idder v. Nelwma Lumber Co., 196 Ore. 409,
249 P.2d 754 (1952).
The title of the Act establishing the Great Sali
Lake Authority, Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, furnishes a detailed geographical description of the territory the Legislature intended
to be included within the phrase "Great Salt Lake and
its environs." The title to the Statute reads in part: "An
act relating to the development of all of the mainland,
islands, minerals and water within the Great Salt Lake
meander line established by the United States surveyor
general;". (Emphasis added).
(2) The surveyed meander line adequately delineates the territorial jurisdiction of GSLA.
Appellant has argued that the United States Surveyor General has never completed a survey of the lake,
and that a legislative reference to such a surveyed
meander line is therefore an inadequate description of
territorial jurisdiction. Since there is nothing in the
record to support this assertion, appellant cites a memorandum filed by the Utah Attorney General in a congressional hearing on Senate Bill 265.
As this Court judicially knows, Great Salt Lake
has been surveyed as to its meander line on a piece-meal
basis, with the survey of each segment being separately
approved by the United States Surveyor General and
accordingly platted on Federal and State land records.

6
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At the present time certain areas on the west side of
the lake remain unsurveyed.

The entire argument of appellant as to this point
is inadequate because:
(a) There is nothing in the record to show that the
surveyed meander is not an adequate territorial
guide;
(b) GSLA is not attempting and has not attempted to exercise any jurisdiction m any unsurveyed area of the lake;
(c) The Court can sustain the reference to the
surveyed meander as a territorial delineatim1,
and judicially limit the GSLA to those areas
of the lake where the meander has been surveyed;
(d) In the nature of the situation, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the Legislature
to find a better definition of territorial jurisdiction than the lake and its environs situated
within the surveyed meander.
The uncertainty of the phrase "Great Salt Lake
and its environs" as used in the body of the Act can
easily be resolved by reference to the title, which contains a statement of the territory the Legislature intended the Great Salt Lake Authority to have within
its .iurisdiction, and consideration of that title by this
l'ourt will quickly eliminate any question of invalidating
7

the Act on the basis of failure to define territorial jurisdiction.
POINT III
THE ACT ESTABLISHING THE GREAT
SALT LAKE AUTHORITY IS NOT VULNERABLE TO ATTACK AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BODY.
Appellant claims that the Legislature has conferred upon the Great Salt Lake Authority unlimited
discretion in the exercise of its statutory powers. It
is clear that courts will not permit a legislature so to
empower an administrative body. It is equally clear
that the Legislature did not so empower the Great
Salt Lake Authority.
( 1) The more recent state court decisions determine the validity of a legislative delega·
tion of power upon the adequacy of the
stated legislative policy and the sufficiency
of protection of the interests affected.

Courts have long recognized the necessity of dele·
gation of certain powers by the legislature to adminis·
trative bodies. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940).
But this recognition has traditionally been coupled with
a suspicion that delegation of power to the administ:ntive body by the legislature may result in usurpatio:i
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by the administrative body of powers which are exclusive to the legislature. This suspicious attitude has
produced such statements as the following: "That the
legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is,
of course, clear." United States v. Shreveport Grain
& Elevator Co., 282 U.S. 3ll, 324, 51 S.Ct. 159, IG2,
75 L.Ed. 359 ( 1931). Despite these rather definite
mbalizations, no congressional delegation to an administrative agency which has been regularly constituted has ever been held invalid by the United States
Supreme Court. Davis, (Adrninistrative Law Treatise,)
Section 2.01 (1958).

It is conceded that the state courts have previously

adhered more zealously to the above stated policies of
the Supreme Court than has the Supreme Court itself.
In recent years, however, the decisions indicate a liberalizing trend in the attitude of state courts toward the
delegation of power by the legislature to administrative
bodies.

A brief consideration of Utah decisions as well as
decisions from several of our sister jurisdictions will
illustrate those factors which state courts deem primarily
persuasive when reviewing a legislative delegation of
power.
The Utah Supreme Court has declared legislative
delegations of power invalid in two major decisions.
Pnion Trust v. Simmons, ll6 Utah 422, 2ll P.2d 190
l.1949) ; Revne v. Trade Commission, ll3 Utah 155,
ln2 P .2d 563 ( 1948) . The factor which persuaded the
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Court to hold the delegation unconstitutionally invafol
is identical in both cases.
The Court in Revnc, supra, articulated with great
specificity the defects in the Barbers' Price and Hour
Act, which rendered several of its sections invalid, and
emphasized that:
"The board is not given power to act for the
public upon its own initiative. Thus the public
interest is subjected to the interests of a grou~
who may be very antagonistic to that public
interest. * * * We believe this act is not properly
confined to the public interest." (P. 568, 192
P.2d).
The language of this Court in Union Trust Co., supra,
is strikingly similar:
"Thus, the operation of the law is not con·
tingent primarily upon the determination of public convenience and advantage by proper admin·
istrative authority, but is primarily contingent
upon the whim and caprice of competitors ... "
(P.192, 211 P.2d).
The Union Trust Co. decision quoted the language
in Revne, supra, relating to the delegation of power by
the legislature, thus indicating approval by the Court
of the principles stated therein, and concluding:
"'Ve recognize, of course, that the legislah~re
may properly delegate to some administratirc
body the duty of ascertaining the facts u~on
which the provisions of a law are to functwn
... " (P.567, 192 P.2d). (Emphasis added).
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This Court in Clayton v. Bennett, 3 U.2d 152,
298 P.2d 531 (1956), quoted the judicial policy earlier
framed in Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98
Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1, 3 ( 1940), indicating a reasonably
liberal view toward the delegation by the legislature
of power to administrative bodies:
"That the legislature may not surrender or
delegate its legislative power is demental. It
may, however, provide for the execution through
administrative agencies of its legislative policy
and may confer upon such administrative officers
certain powers and the duty of determining the
question of the existence of certain facts upon
which the effect or execution of its legislative
policy may be dependent." (Emphasis added).
The Court then stressed the importance of an element
' which has recently been recognized by many courts as
essential to a valid legislative delegation of power to
HU administrative agency-procedural safeguards for
those who are affected by the actions of that body.
"If they [agency members} should fail to regularly pursue their authority, or refuse to do so,
or act in any manner which is arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory . . . , recourse to the
courts is available." (P.536, 298 P.2d).
The above cited Utah decisions permit formulation
of those factors which exert the most persuasive force
Upon this Court in its determination of the constitutional
adequacy of a delegation of power by the legislature
lo an administrative body. Any statute purporting to
s() delegate must contain an ascertainable legislative
11

policy, which will guide the administrative body in its
consideration of facts when implementing the policy,
as well as protection of the public and private interests
involved through effective procedural safeguards provided by the statute in question.
The significance of the above enumerated elements
has been emphasized by the courts of other jurisdictions
The California Supreme Court, speaking through J ustice Traynor, analyzed the insistence upon legislative
"standards" as a result of the judicial desire to insure
the protection of the public interest, and adopted the
view that "standards" and "safeguards" are synonymous as to function.
"The absence of such standards, or safeguards
. . . , renders effective review of the exercise of
delegated power impossible. * * * Delegated
power must be accompanied by suitable safe·
guards to guide its use and to protect against its
misuse." Blumenthal v. Board of Medical E:r·
aminers, 57 C.2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 105 (1962).
The Arizona Court in Schecter v .Killingsworth, 93
Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963), stated its continue<l
reliance upon the criteria of validity of legislative dele·
gation of power to administrative bodies formulate<l
by it in one of its earlier decisions (Southwest En,qineer·
ing Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764, 772, 775
(1955)):
"We note also a distinct modern tendency !0
be more liberal in the granting of discretion in
the administration of laws in fields where the
complexities of economic and governmental con·
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ditions have increased, particularly where it is
impractical to lay down a comprehensive rule.
* * * If the law provides a defined course of
conduct upon the occurrence or determination of
a particular condition or state of facts, even
though that determination is dependent upon an
evaluation in the nature of a deduction from
facts, there is neither an unconstitutional delegation of power nor is the act so indefinite and
uncertain that it can be held to be invalid." (P.
144, 380 P.2d). (Emphasis added).
The Arizona Court in the Schecter opinion was strongly
persuaded by the existence of " ... adequate provision
for judicial review ... " in ruling in favor of the constitutional validity of the delegation of power by the
legislature. (See P. 144, 380 P.2d).

A recent decision of the California Supreme Court
is particularly in point. The Justices were unanimous
in upholding the validity of a legislative delegation
of power to an administrative agency which was established for the accomplishment of purposes substantially
similar to those for which the Great Salt Lake Authority
was established. In Re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal
Project lB, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964).
The Court reviewed an agency which had been created
for the purposes of designating areas in Los Angeles
for development and formulating plans for said development. The Court was realistically cognizant of
the situation motivating the legislature to create such
an agency and the effect that such legislative motivation
should properly have on the court's judgment.

13

"It appears to us likewise that the scope of
permissJble delegatio~ of power to the agency
should be measured m terms of the complexity
and diversity of the conditions which will be e~
countered' in the performance of the final plan."
(P. 558, 559, 389 P.2d).

In the same decision, the Court expressed its attitude
toward the relationship between a legislative body and
an administrative body:
"The essentials of the legislative function are
the determination and formulation of the legislative policy. Generally speaking, attainment of
the ends, including how and by what means they
are to be achieved, may constitutionally be left
in the hands of others." (P. 564, 389 P.2d).
This Court, in the instant appeal, is faced with a situation identical to the situation before the California
Court in the above case.

(2) The Statute establishing the Great Salt
Lake Authority contains an adequately de·
fined legislative policy and sufficient pro·
cedural safeguards.
The Legislature established the Great Salt Lake
Authority for the purpose of development of the Great
Salt Lake and its environs as expressed by Section
65-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This
Section is the initial statement of the Legislative policy.
The remaining provisions of the Statute contain ample
definition of the meaning of the word "development" in
further delineation of the Legislative policy.

14

Section 65-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, establishes an Advisory Council to the Authority. The following State departments and agencies are
members of this Council: State Engineer, Tourist and
Publicity Council, State Parks and Recreation Commission, Fish and Game Commission, State Land Board,
State Road Commission, State Water and Power
Board. The conclusion is inevitable that these departments and agencies were chosen because the GSLA
would be operating in areas wherein the special knowledge of these sister agencies could be of assistance.
Section 65-8-6 ( 5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, describes with specificity what the Legislature means by "development". The Legislature has
instructed the Authority to design plans and programs
to coordinate the development of grazing areas, fish
and game activities, mining and mineral removal, and
natural resources-with emphasis on utilization of water
resources, industrial activities, and recreational and
tourist facilities.
The result intended to be achieved by the Legis··
lature involves a program of operation too varied and
complex to be effectively performed by the Legislature.
The complexity of the intended program necessitated
the creation of an administrative body. To require the
Legislature to be meticulously specific in defining its
policy is to substantially destroy the value of administrative agencies as vehicles for implementing broad
legislative policy.

15

Section 65-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 a:>
amended, expresses the necessity of creating an administrative body in the instant situation by requiring its
members to be persons " ... who shall be selected because of their understanding of and demonstrated interest in the development of the Great Salt Lake au<l
its environs." (Emphasis added). The Legislature thus
recognized its dependence upon the expertise of an
administrative agency to achieve practical realization
of a broad legislative policy-a policy which the Legislature was able to formulate only as a statement of the
result it desired to achieve.
Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, satisfies the second major criterion of validity of a legislative delegation of power to an administrative body by including provisions limiting the Authority's discretion so as to protect the public and private
interests. Throughout the Statute, the Legislature has
specified that the activities of the Authority must be
"reasonably" related to the accomplishment of the
results desired to be achieved. The standard of "rea·
sonableness" is susceptible to practical interpretation
by the judiciary.
The most substantial power delegated to the
Authority, eminent domain, is subject to the provisions
of Title 78, Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
(See Section 65-8-6 ( 7), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended). The procedural limitations imposed upon
the Authority's exercise of the power of eminent domain

16

are more fully discussed in Point IV of this brief. The
protection of public and private interests from arbitrary and discriminatory taking of property by the
Authority is effectively provided for.
In addition to the procedural safeguards mentioned
above, the discretion of the Authority is circumscribed
by Section 65-8-6 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended. Acquisition of all real or personal property,
in any manner authorized by the Statute, requires the
approval of the Legislature. The credit of the State
of Utah cannot be pledged without the consent of the
Legislature, thereby allowing the Legislature to exercise a very effective control upon the discretion of GSLA
with regard to the acquisition of real and personal
property.
( 3) Appellant is not justified in asserting its
ability to ascertain its position under the Act.
A reading of the Act reveals that the Legislature
intended Antelope Island to be included within the term
"Great Salt Lake and its environs." Section 65-8-6
(IO), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, embodies a detailed legislative mandate to the Authority
to initiate immediate action for the purpose of developing properties on Antelope Island as tourist and recreational attractions. The extent of the legislative grant
of power to GSLA to enable it to obey this mandate is
discussed in Point IV of this brief.
The legislative intent with regard to the properties
on Antelope Island is further revealed by Section 6517

8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which
states in part:
"Within the limitations of available funds the
state road commission is authorized to construct
a road from the town of Syracuse to the north
end of Antelope Island along with the necessal'\'
roads on the island to serve the recreational ddvelopment. These roads are to be located by the
state road commission with approval of the authority, and are to be programmed for design
and construction upon the securing of Antelope
Island property." (Emphasis added).
The validity of the legislative delegation of power
to the Great Salt Lake Authority must be decided with
reference to the circumstances motivating the creation
of GSLA by the Legislature.
The Authority was established to accomplish the
desire of the Legislature that the "Great Salt Lake
and its environs" be developed to the maximum extent.
Implementation of such a legislative policy contemplates
a staggeringly complex program of operation. To
require a precise statutory description of such a program would unduly burden the Legislature.
The Legislature has outlined for the Authority's
guidance the purpose to be accomplished and the areas
of operation for accomplishing that purpose. The Ad
defines the methods of operation by enumeration °1
GSLA's legal powers. The Legislature has conferred
upon the Authority that amount of discretion <leerncr~
realistically necessary to successful implementation °1
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the legislative policy. This discretion has been sufficiently limited by procedural safeguards designed to protect
the public and private interests involved, resulting in a
balance which is acceptable to the courts.

There is no basis upon which the delegation of
power to GSLA can be held unconstitutionally invalid.
POINT IV
ANY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
6.5-8-6(10), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953
AS Al\iIENDED, DENYING GSLA POWER TO
I ACQUIRE PROPERTIES ON ANTELOPE
' ISLAND BY EMINENT DOMAIN IS INCONSISTENT "\VITH THE CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The appellant relies upon several widely-respected
canons of statutory construction discussed in detail
below to support an interpretation of Section 65-8-6(10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which
denies the Authority the power to acquire properties on
Antelope Island by eminent domain. It must be emphasized, however, that the primary function of such canons
is to aid the courts in ascertaining the intent of the
Legislature.
( 1) Canons of statutory interpretation will not
be used to frustrate the intent of the Legislature.

The primary purpose of canons of statutory construction is the determination of the legislative intent.
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In determining the legislative intent, the Utah
Supreme Court has generally placed primary emphasis
upon an examination of the purpose of the legislation
as expressed by the statute. "It is generally recognized
that courts will give an act such a construction as will
accomplish its purpose." Ralph Child Construction Cu.
v. StateTax Commission, 12 U.2d 53, 58, 362 P.2d
422, ( 1961).
This Court in Rogers v.
232 P.2d 766 ( 1951), stated
statutory construction is the
tention of the Legislature in
be effectively accomplished.

Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136,
that the primary rule of
ascertainment of the inorder that the intent can

A difficult problem of statutory construction arises
when a provision of a statute is allegedly susceptible
to more than one interpretation. The Utah Supreme
Court has been practical in those instances in which
it has faced this problem. In Driggs v. Utah State
Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d
657 ( 1943), it was stated that the statutory language
must be interpreted to effectuate the purposes of the
statute and " . . . as between two possible constructions, that one will be adopted which does so give effect
to its purpose." (P. 633, 142 P.2d). In Conover v.
Board of Education, 110 Utah 454, 175 P.2d 2~9.
( 1946), this Court said: "It is settled law that an mterpretation which defeats any of the manifest purposes
of the statute cannot be accepted." (P. 210, 175 P.2d).
In Snyder v. Clune, 15 U.2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (196~)
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the Court stated that results incongruous with the legislative purposes are to be avoided. In Rowley v. Public
Service Commission, 112 Utah 116, I85 P.2d 5I4,
(1947), the Court held that legislatve intent will prevail
over a literal interpretation, especially where the literal
interpretation will yield an absurd result. In Maisch
v. United States S'melting, Refining & Mining Co.,
113 Utah IOI, I9I P.2d 6I2, (I948), the Court said that,
in addition to avoiding an interpretation that will result
in confusion or uncertainty, the Court should adopt
that construction which " ... will permit the officials
having the responsibility for its administration to proceed in an orderly manner." (P. 620, I9I P.2d).
The appellant, Island Ranching Company, maintains that a literal reading of Section 65-8-6 (IO), Utah
Code Annotated, I953, would lead to the conclusion
that the property on Antelope Island is immune from
the power of eminent domain as exercised by the Great
Salt Lake Authority. Appellant asserts that two fundamental rules of statutory construction, ejusdem
generis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius, compel an interpretation of the phrase "or other lawful
means" contained in subsection (IO), which would limit
the phrase to legal proceedings in which the consent
of the parties involved is necessary because the specific
Words, "donation", "purchase", etc., preceding the
phrase "or other lawful means" limit that more general
phrase to lawful means having the same common denominator as the specific words, i.e. consent.
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The Utah Supreme Court has said, however. that
the rule of e.rpressio unius est e,rclusio alterius may not
be used to defeat the apparent intent of the Legisl~ture.
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission.
7 4 Utah 103, 277 Pac. 206, ( 1929).
In regard to the use of the maxim ejusdem yencris
the Colorado Court is in accord with the reasoning of
the U tab Court:
"The rule of ejusdem generis is resorted to
merely as an aid of construction. If upon consideration of the whole law upon the subject and
the purposes to be effected, it is apparent the
legislature intended the general words to go beyond the class specifically desi,qnated the rule
does not apply." Martinez v. People, 137 P.~d
690, 693 ( 1943). (Emphasis added).
The language of Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, clearly reveals the purpose of the
Statute to be development of the lake area to the greatest degree possible.
The Legislature revealed its awareness of GSLXs
need for the power of eminent domain when it express])·
granted that power for the purposes of acquiring real
and personal property in furtherance of the purposei
of the Statute. Section 65-8-6 (I), Utah Code Aunotated, 1953. No distinction 3,s to where the propert)·
must be located is made, as long as it is within the "Gre:it
Salt Lake and its environs."
.

. l . tJi··

The property on Antelope Island is w1t.i 111 , .
territorial jurisdiction of the Authority's powers. 1' lJ:
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thermore, the Legislature specifically designated Antelope Island as a primary target for "tourist and recreational uses." Section 65-8-6 ( 10), Utah Code Anno, lated, 1953. Nevertheless, it is argued that despite the
legislative intent revealed by consideration of the preceding paragraphs, the phrase empowering the Authority to act with respect to the property on Antelope
Island excludes the exercise by the Authority of the
power of eminent domain to procure that property.
1

It is submitted that the above argument is more
than sufficient to show that a limitation of the phrase,
"or other lawful means", Section 65-8-6 ( 10), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, by application of rules of statutory
construction formulated by the courts to discover legislative intent, would only frustrate the accomplishment
of a legislative intent that is very clearly stated.

This Court has itself stated a proper course of
action when faced with statutory provisions which appear to be in conflict:
"It is our duty in interpreting a statute to give
effect to the legislative' intent as expressed by
the wording of the statute. If reasonably possible, effect should be given to every part of a
statute and if the enactment is subject to one or
more interpretations by reason of conflicting provisions then that construction which will har-

monize' and give effect to all provisions is pref erred." Taft v. Glade, 201 P.2d 144, 285, 287,
Utah 435 ( 1948).
It is emphasized that Subsections ( l ) and ( l 0)
of Section 65-8-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are not

23

in conflict, but the above quotation is simply in reply
to appellant's erroneous assumption that said proYisiun,
are in fact conflicting. If the phrase "or other lawful
means" contained in Subsection ( 10) is read to include
those means defined as "legal" in Subsection (I), i.e.
purchases, gift, devise, eminent domain, etc., the alleued
conflict would evaporate and effect would be giren tu
all provisions of the Statute in accord with the stated
legislative intent.
/'.')

( 2) The judicial policy of strict construction

of statutes granting the power of eminent
domain is not properly applicable to tbf
GSLA Act.

The appellant has presented case authority, 'rhich
will be examined below, in support of the proposition
that a statute delegating the power of eminent domain
is to be strictly construed against that body which exercises the power. The application of this principle in
the manner proposed by appellant would be improper
when one considers the guidelines set up for application
of the principle and the general policy which has motivated the courts in applying it.
A case much relied on by appellant is Bertagnoli
v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (1950). The Utah
Supreme Court was determining the validity of an at·
tempt by the Salt Lake City Board of Education tn
· by emmen
· t d omam
· proper t y wI11c
· I1 ","lS clearlr
acqmre
·,. ·
outside the territorial boundaries of the Salt Lake Cit)'
School District. Although invalidating this particular
· l tic
1 prn
attempt, the Utah SHpreme C ourt recogrnze<
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priety of case decisions which interpreted similar exercises of the power of eminent domain as authorized
by dear implication of the statute granting the power,
because to interpret otherwise would have rendered
useless the grant of power to condemn for the stated
statutory purposes. (P. 628, 215 P.2d). Such would
be the result in the instant case if GSLA were denied
power to acquire properties on Antelope Island by
eminent domain.

State v. Superior Court for King County, 33 Wasb

76, 204 P.2d 514 (1949), is twice cited by the Utah

, Court in Bertagnoli v. Baker, supra, in support of its
position that statutes granting the power of eminent
domain will be strictly construed. (P. 628, 215 P.2d).
The 'Vashington Court judges the validity of the exercise of the power by determining whether said exercise is expressly granted or necessarily implied from
the statutory language. In the case cited, the Court
said the exercise of the power was clearly invalid because
the statute under which its validity was claimed did
not expressly grant the power of eminent domain for
any purpose whatsoever.
Another case cited by appellant adopts the position
that the power of eminent domain must be clearly and
unequivocally given. Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City
of Aurora, Colo., 126 Colo. 265, 248 P.2d 732 (1952).
In this case, the municipality was attempting to condenm property which had been dedicated to a public
Usp by authority of a statute which expressly granted
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the power to condemn private property only. The Colorado Court held that the attempted exercise was c011 .
trary to the express statutory grant.
The appellant contends that the maxims of "e,jusdem
generis" and "e.J}pressio usius est exclusio alterius"
nullify the express grant of the power of eminent J0.
main to the Authority contained in Section 65-8-6(1),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in regard to the property
on Antelope Island by excluding from the phrase "or
other lawful means", Section 65-8-6(10), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, the right to take property by eminent
domain. Appellant argues that the traditionally "strict
construction" of statutes granting such power can be
justified by application of these two maxims to language which is an express grant of the power of eminent
domain, when viewed in a realistic manner. The aboYe
cases illustrate the circumstances under which courts
properly adopt a strict construction. Consideration of
these circumstances reveal appellant's contention to be
without merit and the interpretation he urges to be
contrary to the "clear implication" of the statute.
The above discussed cases set forth a second ground
upon which courts base adoption of a "strict constru~·
tion" which ground appellant also heavily relies on 1l1
support of his argument.
The proposition is well stated in Bertagnoli v. Bakrr,
supra. The Utah Court held that a statute gran t'mg tb"'
power of eminent domain should be strictly construed
" ... so that no person will be wrongfully deprir<:rt 1' 1
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the use and enjoyment of his property." (P. 628, 215
P.2d).
The Court in Moyle, et al. v. Salt Lake City, III
Utah 20 I, 176 P .2d 882 ( 1947), stated that the purpose
of strict construction of statutes granting the power
of eminent domain is to protect the rights of the property
owner.
It is widely recognized that courts view the exercise
of the power of eminent domain as " ... fraught with
the possibility of injustice and abuse." 18 Am. J ur.,
, Eminent Domain, Section 26. It is the fear of arbitrary
and discriminatory exercise of the power of eminent
': domain which motivates the courts to strictly construe
' statutes which grant this power. The courts attempt to
mitigate these dangers by strictly construing the statute
! granting the power in order to limit the exercise of the
' power as much as possible.
1
:

J

So restrictive a construction is not necessary where
the dangers are mitigated to the point of complete
elimination by the statute itself. Title 65, Chapter 8,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, achieves the desired elimination of the injustices which the Courts fear by imposing procedural safeguards upon the exercise of the.
power of eminent domain by the Great Salt Lake
Authority.
Section 65-8-6 (7), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
requires that the exercise of the power of eminent domain
0r the Great Salt Lake Authority adhere to the pro-
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cedures outlined by Title 78, Chapter 34, Utah CorL·
Annotated, 1953. The Authority is thereby precluded
from acquiring property by eminent domain in an arbi.
trary or discriminatory manner.
Section 78-34-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states
that the Court or the judge of the Court has the power
to determine whether or not the conditions for rnlid
exercise of the power of eminent domain specified in
Section 78-34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, have been
sa tisfi.ed. The conditions are as follows:
"Before property can be taken it must appear:
( 1) That the use to which it is applied is a use
authorized by law;

(2) That the taking is necessary to such use; and
(3) If already appropriated to some public use,

that the public use to which it is applied is
a more necessary public use." Section 78·
34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Application of the above statutory criteria of yalid·
ity to the actions of the Great Salt Lake Authority in
taking property for public use places a substantial limi·
tation on the Authority's discretion. The power of the
Court in eminent domain proceedings constitutes a suf·
ficient controlling element which reviews GSLA's exer·
cise of its discretionary powers.
In addition to the safeguards provided by Title
78, Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Lcgis·
·
· 1 l"11111"t a t.ion on tli',
lature has imposed
an a dd"itiona
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Authority's power to take property for public use.
Section 65-8-6 (I), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires the Authority to procure the consent of the Legislature before pledging the credit of the State for the
purpose of acquiring any real or personal property.
The exercise by the Authority of its power of eminent
domain is subject therefore to a second review.
A reading of Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reveals that the Legislature recognized the
possible arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the
' power of eminent domain and that it provided pro, cedural limitations which would effectively eliminate
this possibility. Therefore, the strict construction urged
by defendant is not justified on the bases which motivate
to courts to adopt a strict construction.
The interpretation of the phrase "or other lawful
means", Section 65-8-6 (IO), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, to include the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the Great Salt Lake Authority in regard
to the property on Antelope Island is consistent with
the plain meaning of the statute, will allow the accomplishment of the stated legislative intent, and will do
no violence to the policy which has previously motivated
the courts to strictly construe statutes which delegate
that power.
(3) A denial to GSLA of the power to acquire

properties on Antelope Island by eminent
domain would grant a special immunity to
Antelope Island, which unconstitutional result the Legislature could not have intended.
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The appellant would have the Court adopt a statutory construction which would render the property of
Antelope Island immune to the Authority's power of
eminent domain.
The property on Antelope Island is clearly withi11
the jurisdiction of the Authority's power as it is speei
fically mentioned by the statute. Section 65-8-6 (10),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Therefore, the construction argued for by the appellant would have the effed
of singling out a certain area of the "Great Salt Lake
and its environs" for special privileges and immunities.
Such a construction of the Statute would transform
Section 65-8-6 ( 10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, into
special legislation in violation of Article VI, Section
26 (16), Constitution of Utah.
The following Utah cases illustrate the manner in
which this Court characterizes special legislation.
A statute must operate uniformly to all within the
jurisdiction of the statute. If a statute discriminates
in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner, it is unconstitutional. 1'ygeson v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah
274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950).
"The mere fact that legislation is made to apply
to certain persons and not to others does not affect its
validity if it be so made that all persons affected by its
terms are treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions." Abrahamsen v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, B U.2d 289, 283 P.2d 213, 21 6
(1955).
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A statute is not special legislation as long as it is
• uniformly applied to those subject to its terms. Entre
· Nous Club v. '1 1oronto, 4 U.2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955).
A statute must apply equally to all members within
the class to which it applies. State v. Twitchell, 8 U.2d
314, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1959).
A law is general if it operates uniformly upon
those things subject to its application. Conover v. Board
of Education, 110 Utah 454, 175 P.2d 209 (1946).
A law must operate uniformly upon all members
: of any class of persons, places, or things in order to be
· classified as general legislation. (Emphasis added) .
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, (1939).
I

If the construction of the Statute requested by
the appellant is adopted by the Court, the Statute would
be unconstitutional as granting special privileges and
inununities in violation of Article VI, Section 26 ( 16),
Constitution of Utah.

The construction requested by appellant is, in the
first instance, clearly violative of the stated legislative
intent and is therefore a strained construction based
solely upon the mechanical application of certain rules
of statutory construction. In addition, adoption of the
construction the appellant proposes would violate the
principle of statutory construction that a statute is
interpreted in favor of a finding of constitutionality.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Section 4509, 3rd
ed.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Patterick v. Carbon
Water Conservancy Dist., et al., 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2il
503 ( 1944), stated its recognition of the general acceptance of this principle:
"It i~ ':"ell established that a court will uphold
the validity of an act passed by the legislature
wherever possible and will not declare it unconstitutional unless its invalidity is apparent." (P.
505, 145 P.2d).

The language of the Court in Donahue v. T¥arner
Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2 U.2d 256, 272
P.2d 177 ( 1954), is even more explicit:
"'Vhere there is ambiguity or uncertainty with
respect to the interpretation or application of the
statute, and two alternatives exist, one by which
the statute would be either unconstitutional, or
serious doubt would exist as to its constitution·
ality, as compared with an interpretation where·
under the statute would be clearly constitutional,
the latter will be given effect." (P. 184 27?
P.2d).
The interpretation proposed by appellant is con·
trary to the plain meaning of the statute. Such an interpretation would require the Court to declare the Statute
unconstitutional when any less artificial interpretation
would raise no doubt as to the Statute's validity.

POINT V
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IS TO INTERPRET THE STATUTE, AS IS, AND NOT TO
ENLARGE.
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,

i

.
A reading of the Statute, as is, shows that it with. stands appellant's arguments without enlargement by
the Judiciary.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Legislature in establishing the
Great Salt Lake Authority was to create an organization sufficiently flexible to implement the legislative
policy. A degree of rigidity greater than that found in
i the procedural safeguards imposed for the protection
of public and private interests would have made accomplishment of the stated purpose an impossibility.
!

A consideration of the purpose hoped to be accomplished shows that the Legislature chose the most realistic definition of GSLA's jurisdiction-the lake and
its environs within the surveyed meander line. A definition which named counties, etc., to be included within
the jurisdiction would be needlessly confusing.
The Legislature placed the problem of the lake's
. development into the hands of persons whose knowledge
i would enable them to set up a working program. The
details of that program were necessarily left to GSLA.
Having outlined a basic plan for implementation
of its policy, the Legislature inserted certain standards
. to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory action by a
i Dody to which it had given very broad powers. These
standards limit GSLA's discretion without destroying
its eft'ectiveness.
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The language of the Act gives sufficient notice
to those who will be affected by its operation-by description of GSLA's jurisdiction-and by specific mention in regard to the appellant in this appeal.
Appellant has failed to present any basis upon
which the Act can be held unconstitutionally invalid.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
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